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Commentary
As the economic extension of the political institutions, the SOEs 
have contributed both directly and indirectly to the growth miracle 
since 1978, but a continual government-led reform is conducted to 
adapt the SOEs to the new challenges and opportunities. The extent 
to which the reform can improve the efficiency and competitiveness of 
the SOEs largely determines how far China can continue its domestic 
economic growth and achieve its international strategies such as AIIB 
and “One-Road-One-Belt”. Some recent academic publications also 
discuss the complementary role of public capital versus private capital 
[1,2]. Apart from the “direct effect” of SOEs through their contributions 
to GDP growth, there is also an “indirect effect” by providing public 
capital and public goods, which would not have been developed so fast 
if relying on the “invisible hand” due to externalities. The “visible hand” 
can accelerate the growth of the “pan” and therefore the growth of the 
whole economy if the SOEs are not competing with but complementing 
the private enterprises.
Different from the comprehensive privatization practice in the UK 
during the 1980s, the reform of the SOEs in China tends to reinforce 
the government’s control over a few “core industries” while opening 
up the other markets to the private and foreign investors. In the form 
of reverse acquisition and M&A, there will be a number of gigantic 
Chinese SOEs emerging and competing in the global market, inflicting 
greater economic and political influences.
A “Pancake Theory” of Economic Growth
The size of the pancake depends on the size of the cooking pan. 
This is also true for the economic growth in China, with GDP being 
the “pancake” and institutions being the “pan”. As the pancake gets 
bigger, the chef has to keep upgrading her cooker to accommodate the 
new needs and challenges—this process corresponds to reform. Since 
1978, “reform and opening up” has been the guideline of the Chinese 
government in both political and economic policies. SOEs have been 
the reform target in the economic dimension ever since. Compared to 
the European and the US institutions which evolve slowly but steadily 
over the last 300 years mostly in a spontaneous way, this process for 
China is much faster and drastic because it only takes 30 years and 
led by the government. As a result, the traditional economic growth 
drivers identified by the neoclassical economists such as technology 
and innovations do not compare with the importance of institutional 
reform in explaining the Chinese “growth miracle”. Without the timely 
and appropriate reform on the obsolete institutions, there would have 
been slower adjustment and the growth rate would have been much 
milder. Hence, the fast economic growth in China is featured as 
government-led or top-down, either proactively or reactively, different 
from the western model which is mainly market-driven or bottom-up.
But why doesn’t China directly change its small “pan” to the largest 
“pan” in the world, such as the one used by the US—full democracy and 
openness? Apart from the political reasons, the Chinese government 
believes that the reform needs gradualism—using an enormous pan to 
cook a very small pancake may not work well or may be even worse, if 
the chef is not ready. This cautiousness is not unreasonable, given the 
bad examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and many others. In 
retrospect of the Chinese history after WWII (Figure 1), this “pancake 
theory” can well explain the interactions and interdependence between 
the economic growth and institutional reform on SOE.
The Industrialization Regime
The Soviet-type planned economy before 1978 had provided the 
scarce resources and executive power to pull a big country like China 
out of the poverty trap and paved the industrial foundation within a very 
short time (30 years) and in a very complicated political environment 
(the cold war), despite many mistakes and detours had been made (e.g. 
Mao Zedong’s “great leap forward” in 1957 and “cultural revolution” 
1966-1976). The “pan” was far from perfect but China had very few 
choices anyway, and it well served the purpose for industrialization in 
a unique historical setting. A consequence resulting from the planned 
economy was a great number of state-owned enterprises. In fact, they 
were more like extensions of the political institutions than “enterprises” 
because their production and pricing decisions followed the political 
directions rather than the market information or profit maximization. 
During this period, the SOEs contributed over 80% of the total GDP, 
in which the share of the secondary industry (mainly manufacture and 
capital goods) has risen from 21% to 48% (Figure 2).
The Restructuring Regime
After achieving industrialization, the next stage of economic 
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Figure 1: The Economic and Reform History of China since 1950.
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development is structural transformation towards the consumption 
goods sector and service sector, which are less capital intensive and 
more demand-oriented. The rigidity of the old SOE institutions no 
longer fit the new features of the fast changing economic conditions. 
Deng Xiaoping initiated two waves of SOE reforms beginning in 1978 
and 1992, resulting in the two booms (Figure 1). During this period, 
many markets which use to be monopolized by the SOEs were opened 
to the private and foreign capital, but the majority of SOEs were still 
operating with a very lower efficiency and profitability, thanks to the 
government’s financial support and a fast growing internal and external 
market demand.
A turning point occurred in 1997 when Asian financial crisis 
kicked in, and the abrupt reduction in China’s export market became 
the last straw on those struggling SOEs. The former premier Zhu Rongji 
was forced to initiate the third wave of SOE reform, shutting down 60 
thousand SOEs and laying off 30 million employees. The reform was 
not smoothly done because it hurt a whole generation’s interest and 
heart—those who were born in the 1950s and devoted their whole life 
in SOEs. There had been fierce protests and “social instability” issues, 
but they were finally tackled by the government, properly or improperly. 
Eventually, the burden SOEs were cleared, and only those with high 
economic performance or strategic roles are kept and reinforced.
In 2003, an ad hoc ministerial department, State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), was established 
to focus on the SOE reform. Since then, nearly half of the SOEs owned 
by the central government were sold off in the form of stocks and MBO, 
in the light of the market-oriented reform philosophy to separate the 
roles of shareholder and manager. As a result, the share of the industrial 
production of the SOEs dropped from 76% in 1978 to about 30% in 
2015 (UK: 4%).
The Streamlining Regime
In the last two regimes, the role of the SOEs rose and fell to serve 
the “big picture” of the macroeconomic development, but mainly in a 
quantity sense. From 2015 onwards, there has been three new features 
in the present SOE reform (counted as the fourth wave) to deal with the 
new opportunities and challenges in the domestic and global market.
First, it focuses on the quality of SOEs and the competitiveness in 
the global market to support the government’s international strategies 
such as AIIB and One-Belt-One-Road. China has never been so active 
in the international community and the SOEs are once again used as 
the economic extensions of the political institutions. In order to achieve 
this objective, the government has been strengthening the central SOEs’ 
control over the “core” strategic industries, such as military goods, 
energy goods, steel, railway, automobile, boat, and telecommunications 
and banking (over 75% of the market share). This is done by integrating 
smaller SOEs into gigantic monopolies that dominate the domestic 
market and competing in the global market, such as AVIC in aviation 
and CRRC in rolling stock. In 2015, Xi Jinping visited the UK to sell 
China’s high speed train and nuclear power station, which are all 
provided by the SOEs.
Second, the means of SOE reform emphasize the use of financial 
market, especially in the form of asset securitization and “mixed 
ownership”. By far, the most popular mode is “reverse acquisition”: the 
SOE separates its best businesses to form a smaller but stronger son 
company which can easily go public, and then the listed son company 
reversely acquire the parent company to make the whole SOE public 
(example: Wuhan Iron and Steel). Another mode is “A+H” if the 
majority of the company’s assets are of high quality: the SOE issues 
IPOs simultaneously in both mainland China stock market (A-share) 
and Hong Kong stock market (H-share) to attract different types of 
investors (example: Bank of China). Vertical and horizontal M&A’s 
are also frequently used to integrate the SOEs in related industries to 
reinforce the competitiveness (example: China Railway Rolling Stock).
Finally, the economic reform on SOEs is twisted with political 
reform, because the managers of the SOEs are also government 
officers. Corruptions are more likely to happen in the SOEs with 
institutional flaws and unsupervised power. Since Xi Jinping took 
over the government, hundreds of ministerial and provincial level of 
government officers has been investigated, including the former officer 
of the SASAC and many CEOs in SOEs. The width and depth of this 
wave of reform in China are unprecedented, partly because of the new 
challenges in domestic and international economy, and partly because 
of the emerging opportunities seen by the Chinese government. Here 
are some future possible directions on the SOE reform, based on the 
recent policy discussions:
•	 Integration of SOEs has been taking place within the 
infrastructure and energy sectors for the purpose of global 
competition with the traditional MNCs.
•	 The reform of SOEs encourages the mixed ownership, in which 
way the private capital can participate in and benefit from the 
SOE-dominated businesses.
•	 The reform is opening up some SOE-monopolized markets 
for the private and foreign investment, including the 
telecommunications and financial sectors.
•	 The reform of SOEs is accompanied by the political reform, 
during which corruption issues are dealt with by the central 
government.
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Figure 2: The Structural Transformation of China since 1950.
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